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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
ARKANSAS OIL & GAS LAW
Carolyn J. Clegg 
KEITH, CLEGG & ECKERT 
Magnolia, Arkansas
CASES
A. REPORTED ARKANSAS and ARKANSAS FEDERAL CASES
(1) Gilbreath v. Union Bank, 309
Ark. 360, 830 S.W.2d 854 (1992)
Before effective date of legislation permitting 
separate assessments for severed mineral interests, 
failure to subjoin assessment of mineral interests 
voided subsequent tax deeds as to those interests. 
Trustee holding record title to mineral interests 
sold at tax sale was not foreclosed from contesting 
validity of quiet-title decree more than 90 days 
after decree, where trustee was never notified by 
personal service or warning order of quiet title 
action, and limitation statute specifically allowed 
court to entertain independent action to relieve 
from judgment any party not personally served with 
process.
(2) Moore & Munger Marketing and Refining, Inc. v. Hawkins, 
962 F .2d 806 (8th Cir. 1992)
Lessee of Chapter 7 debtor's oil pipeline system 
was not entitled to adjustment in contract price 
for purchase of "division orders", which described 
what properties produced oil delivered through pipe-
line and named persons who should receive payment for 
that oil, even though 59 orders were maintained by 
company other than debtor and 82 pertained to pro-
perties not producing oil; agreement provided a price 
adjustment only for those "division orders" rejected 
after initial 15 day period and only under certain 
specified conditions, and lessee did not contend that 
it rejected orders at issue after 15-day period or for 
any of the stated conditions.
(3) Harris v. Stephens Production Company, et al 
310 Ark. 67 (1992)
Where a conveyance and bill of sale, purportedly 
for an oil well, also conveyed "Oil and Gas Leases", 
the instrument was ambiguous as to whether it con-
veyed only the the well or the oil and gas leases 
in the unit, and the Chancellor correctly allowed 
parol evidence to aid in the construction of the 
vague phrase "Oil and Gas Leases".
Page Two
(4) Klein v. Jerral W. Jones and Michael v. McCoy,
________ F .2d __________ (8th Cir. 1991)
Klein v. Arkoma Production Company, et al,
________ F .2d _________ (8th Cir. 1991).
These class action cases filed were by representa-
tives of a class of about 3,000 royalty owners whose 
claims derived from oil and gas leases on property 
located in the Arkoma Basin in Western Arkansas.
The royalty owners were seeking to share in the 
take-or-pay settlement between Arkoma (Jones 
and McCoy) and Arkla. The trial court found that 
the royalty owners were not entitled to share in 
the absence of "production", and further held that 
the three-year Statute of Limitations was applicable 
to a breach of the implied covenant to market gas.
On April 21, 1991, the trial court entered its 
order dismissing the entire action. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals on November 24, 1992, 
reversed the dismissal of the action on the grounds 
that the action was barred by the Statute of 
Limitations and remanded to the trial court. The 
Court determined that money received by a lessee 
in exchange for surrendering a valuable claim under 
the take or pay provisions of the contract is a 
benefit that should be shared with the royalty 
owners.
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(5) Stephens Production Company et al v. Johnson, et al 
311 Ark. 206 (1992)
Suit by mineral owners to cancel 30 year old leases 
for breach of implied covenants to protect from drain- 
age and to further develop and explore and to recover 
damages for drainage. Chancellor cancelled leases 
(except for existing bore holes) for failure to further 
develop but awarded no damages for drainage. Both 
sides appealed.
Where there was no abstract, by either the Appellants 
or the Cross-Appellants, of the Complaint, the Cross- 
Complaint, or either of the Answers, nor was there an 
abstract of the Chancellor’s findings of fact on the 
final order, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that it 
had no choice but to affirm the final order for failure 
of the parties to comply with Rule 9 (d); it is necessary 
for a party to abstract the essential parties of the 
proceedings relied upon for appeal purposes.
B. Cases of Interest Currently (1/1/93) on Appeal
(1) Emily Kitchens Kolb, et al v. Issac Morgan, et al
No. 92-01344, Appeal from Chancery Court of Columbia 
County Arkansas, to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
P age F our
An interpleader action involving a partition in kind 
by family members in 1952. Issue was whether or not 
as a result of a prior mineral conveyance by one 
family member, the partition vested title in fee 
simple to the family members on only title to the 
surface. Chancellor held that only the surface 
estate was partitioned by the Court in its Partition 
Decree in 1952.
Defendants.
(2) Crystal Oil Company, et al vs. Donald Warmack, No.
92-01102, Appeal from Chancery Court of Union County, 
Arkansas to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Case involving cancellation of a 1963 oil and gas 
lease (covering 200 acres), insofar as it pertained 
to 120 acres, for failure of original lessee and 
its assigns to continue the development of the 
entire lease and, in particular, the 120 acres for 
22 years, and for abandonment of purposes of the 
contract for many years prior to 1985. The 
Chancellor cancelled the lease as to the 120 
acres, and ordered that Defendants make an 
accounting to Plaintiff. Defendants appealed.
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Ray GILBREATH v. UNION BANK, Successor Trustee of 
the Catherine C. Morgan Trust
92-52
Supreme Court of Arkanas 
Opinion delivered May 11, 1992
1. Ta x a t i o n  —  ta x  as ses sme nt  —  effect  of  f a il u re  to  s u b j o i n
ASSESSMENT OF MINERAL INTEREST TO ASSESSMENT OF SURFACE
i n t e r e s t . — Although the General Assembly has passed legisla-
tion to permit separate assessment for severed mineral interests, the 
law at the time the tax deeds were issued was that failure to subjoin 
the assessment of mineral interests did void subsequent tax deeds 
for those interests purchased at tax sales.
2. Ju d g m e n t  — a t t a c k  by  in t e r e s t e d  n o n -pa r t y  a f te r  n i n e t y  
d a y s . — The trustee, as the owner of the mineral interest, was never 
appropriately notified by personal service or warning order of 
appellant’s lawsuit to quiet title and should not be bound by the 
resulting decree, especially in light of the language in Ark. R. Civ. 
P; 60(k)  that specifically provides that the rule does not limit the 
power of the court to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgment when that party was not served personally 
with process.
3. Proce ss  —  se r v i c e  o f  pr o c e s s  by  pu b l i c a t i o n  —  b u r d e n  of  
pr o o f  o n  pa r t y  a t t e m pt i n g  s e r v i c e . — The burden is on the 
party attempting service by publication to attempt to locate the 
missing or unknown defendant, and is required to demonstrate to 
the court, by affidavit or otherwise, that after diligent inquiry, the 
defendant’s identity or whereabouts remains unknown.
4. Process  —  se r v ic e  o f  pr o c e ss  by  pu b l i c a t i o n  —  a f f id a v it  
f a c i a l l y  de f e c t i v e  — s e r v i c e  i m pr o pe r . — Where no diligent 
inquiry was made under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1), as evidenced by 
appellant’s failure to conclude in his affidavit that the location of the 
original trustee was unknown, the appellant’s affidavit for a 
warning order was facially defective.
5. A ppe a l  & er ror  — s u ppl e m e n t a l  ab s tr a ct  h e l pf u l  b u t  no t  
n e c e s s a r y . — Where appellee’s supplemental abstract was help-
ful, but not considered to be necessary under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 9(d) 
for an understanding of the issues presented, the motion for costs 
was denied.
Appeal from Sebastian Chancery Court; Harry A. Foltz,
Judge; affirmed; Motion for Costs, denied.
A r k .] G i l b r e a t h  v . U n i o n  Ba n k
Cite as 309 Ark. 360 (1992)
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Walters Law Firm, P.A., by: Michael Hamby, for appellant.
Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield, by: Janice West 
Whitt, for appellee.
Ro be r t  L. Br o w n , Justice. This appeal relates to the 
validity of five tax deeds granted to the appellant, Ray Gilbreath, 
for mineral interests in land located in Sebastian County. The 
chancery court entered summary judgment, setting aside a 
decree which quieted title in those interests in the appellant. The 
appellant now appeals and asserts error on grounds a) that the 
Trustee was procedurally foreclosed from attacking the decree, 
and b) that the chancery court erred in finding the tax deed void. 
We disagree, and we affirm the chancery court’s decision.
The facts are somewhat involved. On August 31, 1970, 
Catherine C. Morgan, a California resident, deeded the mineral 
interests in question to herself as trustee of the Catherine C. 
Morgan Trust. She was not the owner of the surface rights, and 
the surface rights were not involved in this litigation. On October 
12, 1978, Morgan died, and California First Bank (now Union 
Bank) was named successor trustee by the California Superior 
Court. On July 27, 1981, California First Bank (now Union 
Bank), as Trustee, executed an oil and gas lease in favor of 
Stephens Production Company covering part of the mineral 
interests in question. This lease was recorded in the Sebastian 
County Circuit Clerk’s office on October 31, 1981, but the deed 
indexes did not reflect that the lessor bank was leasing the mineral 
interests to Stephens in its capacity as Trustee. The mineral 
interests were not subjoined to the surface interests for assess-
ment purposes in 1981.
Real estate taxes were not paid on the mineral interests in 
1981, and those interests were declared to be delinquent and 
forfeited to the state that same year. In November 1982, the 
appellant bought the mineral interests at a tax sale conducted by 
the Sebastian County Sheriff, and on January 11, 1985, the 
Sebastian County Clerk granted five tax deeds to him for the 
mineral interests which he duly recorded on January 14, 1985.
On May 13, 1985, the appellant filed a petition to quiet title 
for the mineral interests and named as defendants Catherine C. 
Morgan, both individually and in her capacity as trustee, and all
362 G i l b r e a t h  v . U n i o n  Ba n k
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other persons, known and unknown, who claimed any interest in 
the mineral rights. That same day an affidavit for warning order 
was executed by the appellant, which gave Morgan’s last known 
address but did not state that her whereabouts was unknown. 
Also on May 13, 1985, the Sebastian Chancery Clerk issued a 
Notice of Quiet Title Action for publication as the warning order. 
On May 17, 1985, an appointed attorney ad litem sent a letter to 
Morgan’s last known address in California which was returned 
unclaimed on June 18,1985, When no response resulted, a decree 
quieting title to the mineral interests in the appellant was entered 
on July 22, 1985.
Four years later, on July 24,1989, the Trustee filed an action 
to set aside the quiet-title decree on grounds that the appellant’s 
tax deeds were void because the 1981 assessments of the mineral 
interests were not subjoined to those o f the surface owners. An 
additional ground for relief was the failure to serve the Trustee, as 
owner o f the mineral interests. The Trustee asked the court to set 
aside the quiet title decree and for repayment of the royalties paid 
to the appellant. The Trustee also moved for summary judgment. 
On July 2 ,1991, the chancery court granted the Trustee the relief 
requested and entered summary judgment in its favor.
[1] The pivotal issue in this case is whether the failure of the 
Sebastian County Assessor to subjoin assessments of mineral 
interests to assessments of surface interests in 1981 rendered the 
resulting tax deeds void. We hold that it did. Our law at that time 
was clear that the failure to subjoin the assessment of mineral 
interests did void subsequent tax deeds for those interests pur-
chased at tax sales. Garvan v. Potlatch Corp., 278 Ark. 414, 645 
S.W .2d 957 (1983); Hurst v. Rice, 278 Ark. 94 ,643  S.W .2d 563 
(1982); Adams v. Bruder, 275 Ark. 16, 627 S.W .2d 12 (1982); 
Sorkin v. Meyers, 216 Ark. 908,227 S.W .2d 958 (1950). We are 
aware that the General Assembly passed legislation, effective 
April 15, 1985, to permit separate assessments for severed 
mineral interests, but that was long after the 1981 assessments 
which are at issue in this case. See Act 961 of 1985, now codified 
as Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1 112 (1987). Accordingly, the 
chancery court was correct in its decision, and the tax deeds were 
void from date of the 1981 assessments due to failure to subjoin.
(2] The appellant further contends that the Trustee was
A r k .] G i l b r e a t h  v . U n i o n  Ba n k
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foreclosed under Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(k) from coming into court 
more than ninety days after the quiet-title decree and contesting 
the validity of that decree. We hold otherwise on the basis that the 
Trustee, as the owner of the mineral interests, was never appro-
priately notified by personal service or warning order of the 
appellant’s lawsuit to quiet title and should not be bound by that 
decree. See Hurst v. Rice, supra. The Trustee was entitled to have 
its day in court and to raise the subjoinder issue, especially in light 
of the language in Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(k) which specifically 
provides that the rule does not limit the power of the court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment when that party was not served personally with process.
It is undisputed that the Trustee was not personally served. 
Nor was it constructively served according to procedures required 
under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 (0 (1 ) . Rule 4 (0 (1 )  reads in part:
(1) Where it appears by the affidavit of a party or his 
attorney that, after diligent inquiry, the identity or where-
abouts of a defendant remains unknown, service shall be by 
warning order issued by the clerk and published weekly for 
two consecutive weeks in a newspaper having general 
circulation in a county wherein the action is filed and by 
mailing a copy of the complaint and warning order to such 
defendant at his last known address, if any, by any form of 
mail with delivery restricted to the addressee or the agent 
of the addressee.
Here, the affidavit o f the appellant did not state that, after 
making diligent inquiry, Catherine C. Morgan’s whereabouts 
was unknown which is a condition in the rule for the warning 
order’s issuance.
[3] Comment 12 to Rule 4 (f)(1) explains the burden that a 
party must meet to avail himself of service by publication:
The burden is on the party attempting service by 
publication to attempt to locate the missing or unknown 
defendant. Such party or his attorney is required to 
demonstrate to the court, by affidavit or otherwise, that 
after diligent inquiry, the defendant’s identity or wherea-
bouts remains unknown.
That burden was simply not met in this case. The appellant filed
364 G i l b r e a t h  v . U n i o n  Ba n k
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his petition to  quiet title in the mineral interests on May 13, 1985, 
and on that same day filed an affidavit for a warning order which 
said;
That he has made diligent inquiry and that it is his 
information that the defendant, Catherine C. Morgan, 
Individually, and Catherine C. Morgan, Trustee, is a 
nonresident of the State of Arkansas . . . .
The appellant then listed Morgan’s last known address in 
California. Also, on May 13, 1985, the Sebastian County 
Chancery Clerk issued the warning order. Four days later, on 
May 17, 1985, the attorney ad litem for Catherine C. Morgan 
sent a certified letter to her California address which was 
returned unclaimed on June 18, 1985.
[4] Where no diligent inquiry is made under rule 4 (0 (1 ) , 
we have affirmed dismissal of a complaint for improper service of 
process. See Smith v. Edwards, 295 Ark. 182, 747 S.W .2d 580 
(1988). It is obvious in the case before us that the requisite inquiry 
was not made because the appellant did not conclude in his 
affidavit that the location of Catherine Morgan was unknown. 
Accordingly, we hold that the appellant’s affidavit for a warning 
order is facially defective under Rule 4 (0 (1 ).
To summarize, because there was no subjoinder of mineral 
interests to surface interests in the tax assessments in 1981, the 
five tax deeds granted the appellant in 1985 were void. Further, 
because the affidavit for warning order was deficient on its face 
under Rule 4 (0 (1 ), constructive service by publication was not 
effective against the Trustee. Our decision on these points make it 
unnecessary to reach the other issues raised by the appellant.
[5] The Trustee moves for costs totaling $329.75 occa- 
sioned by preparation of a supplemental abstract which it deemed 
necessary for consideration of the appeal. While the pleadings 
and discovery requests abstracted by the Trustee were helpful on 
appeal, we do not consider that they were necessary under Ark.
A r k .] G i l b r e a t h  v . U n i o n  Ba n k
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Sup. Ct. R. 9(d) for our understanding of the issues presented. 
The motion for costs is denied.
Affirmed. Trustee’s motion for costs denied.
806 962 FEDERAL REPORTER. 2d SERIES
Based on the foregoing, we believe there 
is substantial evidence in the record to sup-
port the Secretary's denial of disability ben-
efits for the time prior to September 30, 
1979.
Onstead’s remaining contention is reject-
ed as without merit.
The order affirming the Secretary’s deni-
al of disability benefits is affirmed.
MOORE & MUNGER MARKETING  
AND REFINING, INC., 
Appellant,
v.
Claude HAW KINS, T rustee o f  M acM illan  
Petroleum  (A rkansas), Mbank D allas, 
N.A., M corp M anagem ent Solu tion s, 
Inc., Appellees.
No. 91-3473.
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit.
Submitted April 16, 1992.
Decided April 23, 1992.
Lessee of Chapter 7 debtor’s oil pipe-
line system sought determination that it 
did not owe the full contract price for pur-
chase of "division orders,” which described 
what properties produced oil developed 
through pipeline and named persons who 
should receive payment for that oil. The 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Arkansas, James G. 
Mixon, J., denied lessee’s claim for relief, 
and lessee appealed. The District Court, 
Oren Harris, Senior District Judge, af-
firmed, and lessee appealed. The Court of
* T he  HONORABLE ANDREW  W. BOGUE, United 
S ta tes  S e n io r  District Ju d g e  for the District of 
S o u th  Dakota, sitt ing by designation .
1. The H o n o ra b le  Oren H arris .  United States  
S e n io r  District  Judge  for the W estern  District  of 
Arkansas.
Appeals held that lessee was not entitled 
adjustment in contract price, even though  
59 orders were maintained by company oth- 
er than debtor and 82 pertained to proper- 
ties not producing oil.
Affirmed.
Mines and M inerals 79.1(3)
Lessee of Chapter 7 debtor’s oil pipe 
line system was not entitled to adjustment 
in contract price for purchase of “divi 
orders,” which described what prop 
produced oil delivered through pipeline  
named persons who should receive 
ment for that oil, even though 59 
were maintained by company other 
debtor and 82 pertained to proper 
producing oil; agreement provided a   
adjustment only for those "division o n l f i f c  
rejected after initial 15-day period aitSKwHI 
under certain specified conditions, 
see did not contend that it rejected 
at issue after 15-day period or for 
the stated conditions.
Charles Nestrud, Janie McFarlin, Lina 
Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Gregory Hopkins, Charles Coleman, H i  
Price, Little Rock, Ark., for appellees
Before FAGG and WOLLMAN, Circuit 
Judges, and BOGUE,* Senior District 
Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Moore & Munger Marketing and MOmm 
ing, Inc. appeals from the district court 
judgment affirming the bankruptcy 
court’s 2 denial of its claim for relief. 
affirm.
I.
Macmillan Petroleum (Arkansas), 
("MacArk”) leased its oil pipeline system
2. The H o n o ra b le  Ja m e s  G. Mixon, U nited Staes 
B an k ru p tcy  Judge  for the W estern District 
Arkansas.
MOORE & MUNGER MARKETING & REFINING v. HAWKINS 807
Cite as 962 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1992)
ders that Moore rejected, and the district 
court affirmed.
& Munger Marketing and Refining, 
(“Moore”). MacArk also agreed to sell 
information—“division orders”—to 
The division orders described what 
erties produced oil delivered through 
k’s pipeline and named the persons 
should receive payment for that oil.
agreement stated that MacArk had 
division orders “currently in e ffec t” 
1.2 of the agreement granted Moore 
ight to peruse the 358 division orders 
fifteen days and return those it did not 
nt The number of division orders re  
after the fifteen day period com- 
the “Purchased Number.”
"
agreement also noted that subse- 
’eyents could reduce the value of the 
bn contained in the division or- 
lause 4 therefore provided that, 
c ertain conditions occurred, Moore 
reject division orders that it had ini- 
retained among the Purchased Num- 
4 also provided for a corre- 
ftdjustment to the contract price. 
adjustment was calculated by deter- 
percentage change in the Pur- 
;Number caused by the subsequent
delivered the division orders to 
Moore retained 140 of them, and 
tly rejected two. Moore then 
an action in MacArk’s Chapter 7 
proceeding, claiming, among 
gs, that it did not owe the full 
rice. Moore introduced evidence 
had only 217 division orders, 
because fifty-nine division orders 
maintained by another company, not 
and eighty-two division orders 
to properties not producing oil. 
argued that, since it had the oppor- 
w acquire oil under only 217 division 
not 358, the contract price should 
reduced accordingly.
bankruptcy court held that Moore 
•liable for the full contract price, less a 
minor adjustment for the two division or-
lnstead of the actual division orders, MacArk 
delivered a “division of interest sheet," The 
district court concluded that this constituted 
substantial performance, and Moore does not
II.
Moore argues that de novo review is 
appropriate because the parties written 
contract is unambiguous. See Case Int’l 
Co. v. T.L James C o ., 907 F.2d 65 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (review de novo district court's 
interpretation of an unambiguous contract). 
As MacArk does not dispute this conten-
tion, we review the contract de novo.
Moore argues that the contract price 
should be revised to reflect the lack of 
value in the fifty-nine division orders main-
tained by another company and the eighty- 
two division orders pertaining to properties 
not producing oil.
The agreement does not allow for such 
an adjustment Clause 1.2 permitted 
Moore to return any or all of the division 
orders for any reason, but does not provide 
for a corresponding price adjustment The 
agreement provides a price adjustment 
only for those division orders rejected after 
the initial fifteen day period, and only un-
der those conditions  specified in Clause 4. 
Moore does not contend that it rejected the 
141 division orders  at issue after the fif-
teen day period, or for any o f the causes 
stated in Clause 4. We therefore conclude 
that the district court properly held Moore 
liable for the full contract price, less an 
adjustment for the two division orders  re-
jected in accordance with Clause 4.
The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.
appeal that conclusion. For the sake of conve­
nience we will refer to the documents as divi­
sion orders.
lant moved to dismiss with prejudice his case against Dow 
Chemical. Dow Chemical then moved to dismiss with prejudice 
its cross-appeal. Both motions are granted.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed with prejudice 
in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
A r k .] Ha r r i s  v . S t e ph e n s  Pr o d . Co . 67
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Joe Wayne HARRIS and Elena Harris v. STEPHENS  
PRODUCTION COM PANY, et al.
92-269
Supreme Court of Arkansas 
Opinion delivered June 29, 1992
1. Co n t r a c t s  —  parol  e v i d e n c e  pr o pe r l y  pe r m it t e d . — Where 
a conveyance and bill of sale, purportedly for an oil well, also 
conveyed “Oil and Gas Leases,” the instrument was ambiguous as 
to whether it conveyed only the well or the oil and gas leases in the 
unit, and the chancellor correctly allowed parol evidence to aid in 
the construction of the vague phrase “Oil and Gas Leases.”
2. Ref orm at ion  o f  i n st r u m e n t s  — n o  er ror  si n c e  do c u m e n t  
n o t  r e f o rm ed . — Since the trial court did not remake or reform 
the instrument, but rather allowed parol evidence for the purpose of 
construing the instrument as written, it did not err in “remaking” 
the instrument as appellant argues.
3. Co nt ra ct s  — c o n s t r u c t i o n  — in s t r u m e n t  c o n s t r u e d
AGAINST DRAFTER —  PRIMARILY CONSTRUED TO GIVE EFFECT TO
i n t e n t i o n  OF part ie s . — While an instrument is to be construed 
most strongly against the party that prepared it, the primary rule in 
the construction of instruments is that the court must, if possible, 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties.
4. Appe a l  & err or  — failu re  t o  a r g u e  po i n t  in  o r i g i n a l  br ie f . 
— The court did not reach the merits of appellant’s argument where 
it was not discussed in the appellant’s original brief; points may not 
be argued only in reply.
Appeal from Crawford Chancery Court, Division I; Warren
O. Kimbrough, Chancellor; affirmed.
Ray Edwards of Edwards & Edwards, Charles “Chuck"
Dyer, and Batchelor & Batchelor, by: Fines, F. Batchelor, Jr., for 
appellants.
Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield, by: Michael C. 
Carter and Janice West Whitt, for appellee.
Ro be rt  H. Du dle y , Justice. The plaintiffs, Joe and Elena 
Harris, filed this suit claiming a 100% working interest owner-
ship of the oil, gas, and mineral rights in a 40-acre tract and the 
concomitant rights to the proceeds from a nearby commercially 
producing well that is located in the same drilling unit. The 
chancellor found the plaintiffs' claims to be without merit, and 
they appeal. The ruling of the chancellor was correct, and we 
affirm.
In 1961, Bert Tankersley leased his oil, gas, and mineral 
interest in 100 acres to Gulf Oil Corporation. The lease included 
the 40 acres at issue in the north half of section 8, plus 60 acres in 
section 9. Stephens Production Co., the defendant, and appellee, 
subsequently acquired the leasehold working interest of the 40- 
acre tract in section 8 and then pooled and unitized for drilling the 
north half of section 8 and the south half of section 5. Stephens 
owned 100 % of the oil and gas leases in the 640-acre drilling unit. 
In 1970-71, Stephens drilled a gas well, the Harris-Chitwood No. 
1, on the 40 acres in section 8. The well produced for six years, but 
ceased commercial production in 1977. When commercial pro-
duction ceased, 70% of Stephens’ leases in the unit lapsed due to 
non-production. Stephens held the remaining 30 % by production 
since those leases contained acreage that was in other producing 
units. Earlier, in June 1968, Chevron had drilled the Chevron- 
Whitlock No. 1 Well in the section 9 drilling unit that contained 
the other 60 acres of the Tankersley lease. The Chevron- 
Whitlock No. 1 Well has produced in paying quantities since 
1968 and so, unless otherwise terminated, Stephens holds the 40- 
acre tract by virtue of production on the 60 acres.
Plaintiffs, Joe and Elena Harris, through the years pur-
chased four tracts of land, comprising about 500 acres, all located 
in the immediate area. One of the tracts, which was apparently 
purchased in 1974, is the 40-acre tract in section 8. The Harris- 
Chitwood No. 1 is located 2,000 feet north of plaintiffs’ house.
After the Harris-Chitwood No. 1 ceased commercial pro-
68 Ha r r i s  v . S t e ph e n s  Pr od . Co . [310
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duction, Stephens attempted without success to interest other 
production companies in drilling in the unit and, in 1980, decided 
to cap the well. When Stephens sent a crew to cap the well, 
plaintiff Joe Harris met them and asked them not to cap it, but 
instead to let the Harrises use the gas from the well for their home. 
A Stephens vice-president told Harris that he would have to get 
the approval of the Oil and Gas Commission. With the help of his 
attorney, Harris drafted a letter to the Commission asking it to 
allow him to assume the responsibility and the liability for the 
well and for the future expense of capping of it. The Commission 
responded by letter telling Harris what he would have to do in 
order to be allowed to use the well for his personal use. About a 
year later, Stephens wrote the Harrises and told them that it 
would cap the well if it did not hear from them in forty-five days. 
There was additional correspondence and then, in October of 
1982, Stephens mailed to the Harrises a “Conveyance and Bill of 
Sale,” with a copy to the Commission and to the plaintiffs’ 
attorney. The Harrises paid nothing for the conveyance. In 1983, 
the commission gave the Harrises the right to use the well for 
household purposes.
In 1986, TXO Production Corp. became interested in 
drilling another well in the same unit in which the Harris- 
Chitwood No. 1 is located and, to that end, leased some of the 
Harrises’ other property, but not the 40 acres at issue. TXO 
declined to take a lease from the plaintiffs on the 40 acres at issue 
because it concluded that was held by Stephens as a result of 
production. Stephens participated in the drilling of the well, the 
Wamock No. 1, which was successfully completed in December 
of 1986. The well is in commercial production, and Stephens has 
paid royalties to the plaintiffs since production began. Over two 
years after the completion of the Wamock No. 1, the plaintiffs 
filed this suit claiming a 100% working interest ownership in the 
40-acre tract because of the 1982 “Conveyance and Bill of Sale.” 
Stephens counters that the conveyance shows on its face that it 
conveyed only the well, while the plaintiffs contend that it 
conveyed the entire unit. The chancellor ruled that some of the 
language in the instrument was ambiguous and allowed parol 
evidence to determine the true intent of the parties. The plaintiffs 
assign this ruling as error. The nature of the case itself tends to 
show the correctness of the chancellor’s ruling. The Harrises
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contend that the instrument conveyed the gas leases in the unit, 
while Stephens contends that it conveyed only the well. The 
instrument provides:
That in consideration of the sum on O N E DOLLAR  
($1.00), the receipt o f which is hereby acknowledged, and 
the further release o f all liability and responsibility, 
ST E PH E N S PRODUCTION C O M PANY does hereby 
SELL, DELIVER and TRANSFER unto JOE H ARRIS, 
Route 1, Alma, Arkansas 72921, all o f its interest in and to 
the physical equipment, Oil and Gas Leases, and all other 
property rights owned, used or held by it in connection with 
the Harris-Chitwood #1 Well located 850 feet East and 
530 feet South of the Northwest corner of the Northwest 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (N W /4  N E /4 ) of 
Section 8, Township 9 North, Range 30 West, Crawford 
County, Arkansas. This conveyance is made without 
warranty of title, either express or implied, and is also 
without representation as to the quantity, quality or 
continued life of the subject well.
Joe Harris, by the acceptance of this conveyance, 
hereby agrees and stipulates that the interest conveyed 
hereby shall not be transferred or conveyed, in whole or in 
part, to any other person or party and the gas, if any, 
produced from said well shall not be sold, bartered or 
conveyed to any other person or party, it being understood 
that the gas is for the personal, sole and exclusive use o f Joe 
Harris on the premises adjacent to the wellhead.
As a part of the consideration for this transfer, Joe 
Harris hereby stipulates and agrees that Stephens Produc-
tion Company shall not be responsible for the plugging of 
said well nor shall it be liable for any claims or obligations 
in connection with the production of gas therefrom. Joe 
Harris agrees hereby to hold Stephens Production Com-
pany harmless from the claims of all persons whomsoever 
arising out of or in connection with the operation or 
production of gas from the Harris-Chitwood #1 Well and 
from any and all actions, causes of action, claims and 
demands for, upon, and by reason of any damage, loss or 
injury sustained by anyone in consequence of the further
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operations of said well.
EXECUTED this 11th day of October, 1982.
With the exception of one phrase, the instrument would not 
be ambiguous, and its purpose clearly would have been only to 
sell, deliver, and transfer to the plaintiffs the well. However, in the 
seventh line, the instrument contains the phrase “Oil and Gas 
Leases” and, arguably, the instrument could be construed to 
mean that it conveyed Stephens’ oil and gas leases in the unit. 
Thus, it contained an ambiguity, and the chancellor allowed parol 
evidence to aid in the construction of the vague phrase. The 
chancellor’s ruling was correct. In Mays v. Barnett, 150 Ark. 492, 
496, 234 S.W. 488, 489 (1921), we quoted with approval from 
Brown & Hackney v. Daubs, 139 Ark. 53, 213 S.W. 4 (1919) as 
follows:
Parol evidence to vary the terms of a written contract is one 
thing; such evidence to enable the court to say what the 
parties to a contract intended to express by the language 
adopted in making it is quite another thing. The former is 
not permissible. . . . The later is permissible, and is often 
absolutely essential to show the real nature of the agree-
ment. . . . Both rules are elementary, and do not conflict 
in the slightest degree with each other. . . .  A failure to 
keep in mind the wide distinction between varying a 
contract by parol evidence and resorting to such evidence 
in aid of its construction often leads to error. [Emphasis 
added.]
[1] The attorney who drafted the instrument for Stephens 
testified that the purpose of the phrase was to give the plaintiffs 
the lease hold interest in the well itself, and the Harrises would 
then be responsible in the event other royalty owners in the unit 
asked for royalties on the gas used in the Harrises’ house, or if the 
State assessed severance tax on the gas used by plaintiffs, or if 
there was a State conservation assessment on that production. 
The attorney testified that there was no intent to give the plaintiff 
all of the leases in the unit. Other correspondence between 
plaintiffs, Stephens, and the Commission, shows that, at the time 
of the instrument, the plaintiffs’ understanding and intention was 
that they were to receive Stephens’ ownership only in the Harris- 
Chitwood No. 1, subject to the conditions imposed in the
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instrument. In sum, the chancellor correctly allowed parol 
evidence to aid in the construction of the vague phrase “Oil and 
Gas Leases.”
12) The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in 
remaking the instrument. We summarily reject the argument. 
The trial court did not remake or reform the instrument, rather it 
allowed parol evidence for the purpose o f construing the instru- 
ment as written.
[3] The plaintiffs’ final two arguments are treated together. 
They argue that the trial court erred in failing to construe the 
instrument most strongly against the party that prepared it and 
that the decision is clearly erroneous. While an instrument is to be 
construed most strongly against the party that prepared it, the 
primary rule in the construction of instruments is that the court 
must, if  possible, ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
parties. Sternberg v. Snow King Baking Powder Co., Inc., 186 
Ark. 11 6 1 ,57S.W .2d 1057 (1933). Even when this instrument is 
construed most strongly against the party that prepared it, the 
plaintiffs cannot prevail. Finally, the ruling of the chancellor, 
rather than being clearly erroneous, is eminently correct.
[4] In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue that the chancellor 
erroneously concluded that Stephens held the lease to the 40 acres 
by production in the neighboring unit. We do not reach the merits 
of this argument, as it was not discussed in the plaintiffs’ original 
brief, and points may not be argued only in reply. Myers v. 
Muuss, et al., 281 Ark. 188, 662 S.W .2d 805 (1984).
Affirmed.
Br o w n , J., not participating.
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BACKGROUND
The events leading up to this lawsuit occurred against a 
background that was recently discussed by the Supreme Court. We 
quote from the syllabus:
In response to ongoing natural gas shortages, 
Congress enacted the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 
(NGPA), which, inter alia, established higher price 
ceilings for "new" gas in order to encourage production 
and carried over the pre-existing system of "vintage" 
price ceilings for "old" gas in order to protect 
consumers. However, recognizing that some of the vintage 
ceilings might be too low, Congress, in S 104(b)(2) of 
the NGPA, authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission to raise them whenever traditional pricing 
principles under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) would 
dictate a higher price. After the new production 
incentives resulted in serious market distortions, the 
Commission issued its Order No. 451, which, among other 
things, collapsed the existing vintage price categories 
into a single classification and set forth a single new 
ceiling that exceeded the then-current market price for 
old gas; established a "Good Faith Negotiation" (GFN) 
procedure that producers must follow before they can 
collect a higher price from current pipeline customers, 
whereby producers may in certain circumstances abandon 
their existing obligations if the parties cannot come to 
terms; and rejected suggestions that the Commission 
undertake to resolve in the Order No. 451 proceeding the 
issue of take-or-pay provisions in certain gas contracts, 
such provisions obligate a pipeline to purchase a 
specified volume of gas at a specified price, and, if it 
is unable to do so, to pay for that volume. They have 
caused significant hardships for gas purchasers under 
current market conditions.
Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United 
Distribution COS. 498 U.S. 211, ___, 111 S. Ct. 615, 617 (3991) 
"The HONORABLE BRUCE M. VAN SICKLE, Senior United States 
District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by 
designation.
FACTS
The named plaintiffs/appellants are the representatives or a 
class of about 3,000 royalty owners. Their claims derive from oil 
and gas leases on property located in the Arkoma Basin, in Western 
Arkansas. Defendant/appellee Arkla, Inc. (Arkla) is a corporation 
with its principal place of business in Shreveport, Louisiana. 
Defendant/appellee Arkla Exploration Company (ASC) is likewise a
corporation with its principal place of business in Shreveport. At 
all times relevant, it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arkla, 
Inc., and operated as the exploration and production company of 
Arkla, Inc. Arkla Energy Resources (AER), while not a named party, 
is a division of Arkla, Inc, which operates Arkla's pipeline.
Defendants/appellees Jones and McCoy founded Arkoma as an 
Arkansas corporation in 1981. Jones owned two-thirds of the stock 
and McCoy owned one third. Jones was chairman of Arkoma's board of 
directors and a corporate officer, and McCoy was Arkoma's president 
and its chief geologist and engineer. Arkoma was in the business 
of natural gas exploration, development and production. They sold 
their interests in the company to ABC on December 31, 1986. Jones 
and McCoy were joined as defendants in this action by virtue of 
this sale and the assignment to Arkoma, prior to that sale, of 
their interests in various producing wells involved.
The various Arkla entities will be collectively referred to as
the Arkla parties" or as, simply, "Arkla" unless the context 
otherwise warrants. In such cases they will be designated as 
"Arkla", "AER", "ABC", or "Arkoma".
Development in the two primary fields, the Aetna and Cecil 
Fields, commenced in the 1950'a. Typically, mineral owners gave 
leases to production companies which provided for the payment or 
royalty based on the market value of 1/8 of the gas sold or used 
off the premises, or 1/8 of the amount realised from the sale at
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■the wellhead. Many leases in the Cecil Field contained a fixed 
rate royalty provision which calculated the royalty at 1/8 or the 
value fixed at a certain amount per thousand cubic feet (mcf) of 
gas sold. Those fixed price leases were converted to market value 
leases in separate litigation in the Chancery Court or Franklin 
County, Arkansas, in 1990.
On December 31, 1982, Arkoma, then owned by Jones and Mccoy, 
agreed with Arkla, a major developer in the Arkoma Basin, to 
purchase one-half of Arkla's leasehold interest for $16 million. 
Arkoma agreed to spend an additional $30 million in a drilling 
program over a four year period, and to share additional acreage 
acquired in the Aetna and Cecil Fields from other lease owners. 
This transaction resulted in Arkoma and Arkla owning virtually all 
of the rights to drill new wells in the Aetna and Cecil Fields. 
Shortly thereafter, Jones became a member of the board of Arkla.
On February 24, 1983, Arkoma and Arkla executed a gas purchase 
contract, identified as GPC 5239, covering new wells to be drilled 
in the Aetna and Cecil Fields, as well as any other acreage to be 
acquired by Arkoma, and by which Arkla agreed to pay Arkoma the 
maximum lawful price under §§ 102 and 103 of the NGPA. At the time 
o f  the agreement, the § 102 price for the eras was $3.83 per mcf. 
The contract contained a pricing provision which allowed Arkoma to 
renegotiate the contract price during its term, It provided a 75% 
minimum take-or-pay provision by which Arkla was obligated to take 
75% of the daily deliverability from Arkoma's wells. or to pay for 
a l ike amount of the gas at the contrast rate1. Arkoma committed
Take or pay clause
A clause in a gas purchase contract requiring the purchaser to 
take, or failing to take, to pay for the minimum annual contract 
volume of gas under which the producer-seller has available for 
delivery. Under such clause the purchaser usually has the right to 
take gas paid for (but undelivered) in succeeding years. Such gas 
is called makeup gas. See Howard R. Williams and Charles J. Meyers, 
Oil and Gas Terms, 249 (1959), citing Howell, Gas Purchase
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its working interests together with all royalty interests of the 
appellant class to the contract.
Arkoma began an aggressive drilling program, achieving a 
success ratio in excess of 90% , against an industry standard of 
only approximately 50%. In the process, Arkoma became one of 
Arkla's largest suppliers of gas.
In 1985-86 Arkla curtailed the quantities of gas it took from 
Arkoma, but did not honor the pay provisions of GPC 5239. By 
March, 1986 ;• cw outstandlng take-or-pay billings from Arkoma to 
Arkla were in excess of $16 million, and were accruing at a monthly 
rate of approximately $3 million. At about that time, Jones 
resigned from the Arkla board. Arkla then refused to pay for the 
gas it had not taken. Arkla calculated that it was obligated to 
buy 40,000 mc f per day and was taking only 12,000 mcf; that the 
potential take-or-pay obligation owed to Arkoma could reach $54 
m illio n  by the end of 1986 and would increase by $40 million during 
1987; and it determined that only 10% of the take-or-pay billings 
were debatable .
Arkla entered into negotiations with Jones and McCoy to 
resolve the problem. The negotiations for settlement or the take- 
or-pay obligations were resolved on December 31, 1986, when Arkla
simply bought it* .■<;* '„■«* . The tax partnerships, (controlled and 
primarily owned by Jones and McCoy), which actually owned the 
producing wells,  . i of their int-erests to Arkoma as did 
Jones and McCoy then all of Jones' and McCoy's
stock  in  Arkoma,  i i ih g  Arkoma Production Company and 
g a in in g  th e  a b i l i t y  GPC  Jo n es and McCoy
assigned all drilling   to Arkoma in exchange for a
promissory note in the amount o f $35 m illio n , guaranteed by a e c .
Contractact l l.-i , i's&* i.. ’C,
r  aw !. : f'.
■; • . i 
b  .
d a t i o n ,  F o u r t h  A n n u a l  I n s t i t u t e  o n
) 5 0  170 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ,
That note was paid the same day.
"Neww” Arkoma, that is, Arkoma as it existed after acquisition 
by AEC, also agreed to furnish Jones and McCoy, free of cost to 
them, 5.8 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas over a five year period. 
AER agreed to purchase this gas at prices beginning at $4.77 per 
mcf in 1987, and escalating to $6.08 per mcf in 1992. To secure 
its obligation to purchase this gas, AER gave Jones and McCoy a 
promissory note in the amount of $24 million, which was the net 
present value of that gas purchase contract.
"New" Arkoma agreed to pay Jones and McCoy at the rate of 
$1.62 per mcf for any newly established additional reserves. For 
the stock in Arkoma, Arkla paid Jones and McCoy, in addition to 
satisfying the promissory note of $35 million, a cash consideration 
of $14 million. The total consideration paid by Arkla on December 
31, 1986, was $73 million, $35 million for the promissory note, $24 
million for the gas purchase contract to buy free gas, and $14 
million for the Arkoma stock.
After the sales by Jones and McCoy to Arkoma of their lessee 
interests, and after the sale of Arkoma to AEC, and during the 
period of the settlement of the take-or-pay claims and 
renegotiation of GPC 5239, Arkoma was wholly owned by AEC (Arkla's 
production company)• And AER, (the pipeline), vas also wholly 
owned by Arkla.
On February 13. 1987, AER, AEC and Arkoma amended the price 
provisions and the take-or-pay provisions in GPC 3239. They 
reduced the contract price for gas from $3.83 per mcf to $2.20 per 
mcf, and released gas on the spot market for sale at prices less 
than $1.50 per mcf. Appellants, who knew nothing of the details of 
these confidential transactions of December 31, 1986, and February 
13, 1987, and which the participants concealed from the Arkansas 
Public Service Commission, did not find out that they would be
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receiving less money for their royalty interests until they 
received their January production payments from Arkla in late 
March , 1987.
After Jones and McCoy directed "New" Arkoma to drill 
additional wells, which they were entitled to do under the December 
31, 1986, transactions, the parties had a new dispute. It 
concerned additional consideration due to Jones and McCoy for 
drilling of the new wells. To resolve the dispute AEC paid Jones 
and McCoy an additional $100 million in 1989, which included 
payment for reserves, the balance due on free gas, and interest.
On December 31, 1986, the fair market value of gas reserves in 
the ground vas 83¢ per mcf. However, Arkla paid Jones and McCoy 
$1.62 per mcf. The difference in the fair market value of the 
reserves and the amount paid to Jones and McCoy represented the 
value paid to Jones and McCoy to settle Arkla's take or pay dispute 
under GPC 5239; and to put it in a position to amend the gas 
purchase contract.
Plaintiffs/appellants assert, and defendants/appellees do not
contest, that except for the fixed rate leases, the royalty
provisions took the following basic fora;
Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty on gas, casinghead gas, 
distillate, condensate, and other gaseous substance produced 
from said land and sold or used by Lessee off of the land or 
in the manufacture of gasoline or other products, the market 
value at the mouth of the wells of one-eighth (1/8) of such 
products so sold or used. on all gas, casinghead gee, 
condensat e  and distillate sold at the wells by the Lessee the 
royalty shell be one-eighth (1/8) of the amount realised from 
such sales.
The fixed rate royalty provisions took the following form:
The Lessee shall pay Lessor as royalty for gas the equal one- 
eighth (1/8) of the value of such gas calculated at the rate 
of Four (4¢ ) cents per thousand cubic feet corrected to two 
pounds above atmospheric pressure while the same ie being sold 
or used off the premises.
7
Corporate Appellees' Appendix at 132 (emphasis added). As
previously noted, in separate litigation the fixed rate leases were
oonverted to market value leases. The fixed rate leases were:
Converted into leases providing for the payment of 
royalties based on the proceeds received at the wellhead 
from the sale of the produced gas. . . .  As to the 
production from and after [July 1, 1990], all such
royalties shall be paid by the lessees according to the 
proceeds, net of lawful taxes or assessments and other
proper charges authorized by law or the lease agreements, if any, received by the lessees at the well for all gas 
produced from the leased premises. . • . Arkla warrants 
that the royalty payment level on its converted proceeds 
leases will be no less than the royalty payment level 
applicable to the market value leases as to which Arkla 
is a lessee in the Cecil Gas yield Settlement Area.
Glen Morris, et al. v . Arkansas Louisiana Gee Company, et al., In
the Chancery Court of Franklin County, Arkansas, Charleston
District, No. E-86-40, Final Order, Filed on May 21, 1990 (Exhibit
1 at 5) •
While the briefs and the arguments refer frequently to 
contracts and agreements among developers and distributors - 
marketers of oil and gas - these plaintiffs/appellants claim as 
royalty owners and under leases between royalty owners and 
developers. And the plaintiffs/appellants ' rights in these matters 
must arise out of the oil and gas leases executed by the royalty 
owners.
PROCEDURE
The lawsuit was filed February 23, 1990. Plaintiffs/Appellees 
Jones and McCoy filed a motion for summary judgment January 1, 
1991. The Arkla defendants/appellees filed a motion for summary 
judgment January 18, 1991. Each group filed its Statement of
Material Facts and, on March 4, 1991 the trial court, ruling from 
the bench during a hearing on a motion for summary judgment,
dismissed all claims against Jones and McCoy and all claims against 
the other defendants, except the claim based on a breach of the
—8-
implied covenant to market gas. After a bench trial that lasted 
seven days/ the court found that the action was time barred and, on 
April 21, 1991 entered its order dismissing the entire action. At 
the request of the appellants, on May 7, 1991, the court entered an 
order affirming the previous dismissals.
DISCUSSION
While the statements of the issues vary among the parties, the 
areas of concern expressed by the trial judge covered all the 
issues, and that outline will be followed here.
Further, in review of these issues this court will be guided 
by the standard that the appellate court views the case in the same 
manner as the trial court, Western Casualty & Surety Co. v . 
National Union Fire Insurance Co., 677 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1982); 
and we review the trial court's rulings on the applicable state lav
de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, ___ U.S. ____, 111 S. Ct.
1217 (1991). We will turn, therefore, to the bench discussion of 
the trial court at the hearing on March 4, 1991.
Turning now to the specific counts or claims made by 
plaintiffs:
1. General Breach of Duty of Fair Dealing Arising from a 
Fiduciary Relationship.
In Amoco Production Co  v . Ware, 269 Ark 313, 602 s.w.2d 620 
(1980), the Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the 
relationship of a developer to a lessor among a group of lessors 
and recited the five implied warranties arising out of the lessor-
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lessee relationship. It found no fiduciary relationship and it 
found no implied breach of fiduciary duty by lessee. Instead, it 
defined the duty owed each lessor, and to the lessors as a group, 
to act for the mutual advantage of both. It held that the lessee 
must act in a reasonable and prudent manner, using reasonable 
judgment, and not act arbitrarily.
In this case the take-or-pay elements in the developers 
contracts with the pipeline/marketer were, because of Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission intervention, literally bankrupting 
the pipeline, and those facts must be considered in evaluating the 
reasonableness of defendants' actions. We find it reasonable for 
the defendants to make some effort to liquidate the take-or-pay 
obligations of AEC.
2. Third Party Beneficiaries.
Plaintiffs also sought relief as third party beneficiaries of 
GPC 5239. The Restatement defines third party beneficiaries as 
follows:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and 
promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended 
beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in 
the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the 
intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will 
satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay 
money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the 
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the 
benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is
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not an intended beneficiary.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, S302 (1981). The comments to 
this section provide no examples dealing with oil and gas leases.
Under the lease# the lessee's failure to perform will defeat 
the lessee's interest, so it follows that there is not a continuing 
obligation of performanca, i.e. the lessee can abandon the lease. 
Nor does the lessee indicate by assignment of the lease that he 
intended to give the beneficiary any further benefit of promised 
performance. Therefore# it follows that the lessors are only, at 
the most, incidental beneficiaries and we affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of this claim.
3. Tortious Interference with a Contractual Relationship.
The next claim made is that of tortious interference with a 
contractual relationship between the lessor and the lessee. But, 
the leases are admittedly assignable, and the original lessee and 
transferor committed no unlawful act in exercising the right to 
assign. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of this claim.
4. Unjust Enrichment
This court's power extends to the equity aspects of this 
problem. U.S. Const. Art. III, S 2# cl. 1. The doctrine of unjust 
enrichment, that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich 
himself inequitably at another's expense is not contractual, but is 
equitable in nature. Black's Law Dictionary 1705 (4th ed. 1968).
"Take-or-pay" provisions in a lease are nothing new. See 
Southwestern Legal Foundation# Fourth Annual Institute on Oil and 
Gas Law and Taxation, 151, 170 (1953). It cannot be claimed by the 
defendant that the parties to this lease could reasonably foresee 
that# under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, lessors would find 
their market shattered by the service of mandates issued by the
-11-
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. In the course of those 
mandates, the market price of gas was determined not by the 
commercially logical principle of fitness of the gas for the 
purpose for which it was intended, but rather by an illogical 
principle related to the age of the wells.
The resulting market distortions forced the pipeline (AER) to 
take only the old gas, at a price level which the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission felt the customer would accept. The problems 
of lessor/royalty owners which arise with reference to take-or—pay 
clauses are generating substantial litigation as lessee/developers 
and marketer/pipeline owners, seek to resolve marketing problems 
created in the course of administration of the National Gas Policy 
Act of 1978 (NGPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432, which allowed gas price 
increases through supervised deregulation.
Three factors cry for equity intervention in this situation:
1. As shown by the legislative history of the NGPA, at no 
time during the development of the Act did Congress concern itself 
with the impact of the Act on the rights of lessor/royalty owners. 
See Legislative History, P.L. 95-621, 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Ses s . ,  
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7, 8800.
2. The artificial market distortion forced the pipeline, AER, 
to take the "old" gas and sell it at an artificial price to the 
consumers, and to abandon its efforts to honor the pay obligations. 3
3. Where before the purchase of Arkoma, its interest was 
consistent with that of the lessors, after AEC bought Arkoma its 
primary interest was with the pipeline, AER, because both were 
wholly owned by Arkla. Thus the lessors no longer had a 
representative dealing at arms-length with the pipeline. And 
lessors/royalty owners had no direct input into the making of the 
take-or-pay contracts since take-or-pay is a part of the 
developer/pipeline contract.
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By its nature, gas can pass from on© collection point in a 
reservoir to another, so a well, once opened, should be constantly 
tapped; and at the same time since gas is difficult and dangerous 
to store on the surface, and its users normally demand reliable, 
constant, access to it, both the developer and the pipeline want a 
constant flow.
As a result of the policies of the NGPA and the high demand 
for gas in the 1980's, and the inherent nature of gas, developers 
could, and did, get favorable take-or-pay provisions in their 
contracts. See, Kirk  J. Brily, Comment, Royalty on TaKe-or-Pay 
Payments and Related Consideration Accruing to Producers. 27 Hous. 
L. Rev. 105 (1990).
But the NGPA developed the concept of "vintagizing" (i.e. 
classifying by the age of the wells), gas for purposes of producer 
price regulation that arose under the NGPA. "Old flowing gas" vas 
held to price ceilings far below the market clearing price of gas. 
This pool of artificially low-priced gas has produced "horrendous" 
distortions of the gas market.2 And it was this distortion of 
market conditions, and efforts to adapt gas production contracts 
between developers and pipelines which generated the litigation 
before us now. See Richard J . Pierce, Jr., Lessor /Lessee Relations 
in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38th Oil and Gas Inst. $8.04 (Matthew 
Bender 1987) .
It is inevitable that as developers and pipeline marketers 
attempted to resolve problems of take-or-pay liabilities between 
themselves, the claims of royalty owners would arise.
In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. U .S. Dept . of Int., 647 F. Supp. 1350
2. Lessor Lessee Relations in a Turbulent Gas Market, 38th Oil 
& Gas Institute, 8.04 (Mathew Bender 1987).
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(W.D. La. 1986) , the Department of Interior, the royalty owner, 
claimed royalty on a take-or-pay payment that Mesa, the developer, 
had received from the pipeline. The court denied recovery, 
pointing out that the lease required "production" and the "pay" 
arose in an absence of production.
In Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 86-536, slip op. 
(B.D. La. 1986), the United States District Court reasoned that the 
take-or-pay payments are intended to compensate the developer for 
costs necessary to keep the well functioning, so they fall within 
the definition of "production" as activities which take place after 
the successful completion of the well, such as operations, 
monitoring, and maintanance .
The case was appealed and reviewed in Diamond Shamrock 
Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 P.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988). The 
Circuit court rejected the Shamrock decision and held flatly that 
"[f]or purposes of royalty calculation and payment, production does 
not occur until the minerals are physically severed from the 
earth." Id. at 1168.
However, in January of 1988 the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (OCSLA) as administered by the Minerals Management Service, 
(MMS) , revised its gas royalty evaluation regulation to provide:
"The value of gas • . • sold pursuant to an arm's-length 
contract shall be the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee." 
"Gross proceeds" are defined as "[t]he total monies and other 
consideration accruing to an oil and gas lessee . . . includ[ing] 
but . . . not limited to: Take-or-pay payments; . . , and other 
reimbursements. . . . "  30 C.F.R. 206.151 ac quoted in Brily, 
supra3. The author of that comment concludes# as to m m s ' position
that:
3. The 1992 CFR omits the words "take-or-pay payments".
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The likelihood remains remote that a court will find that 
the MMS overstepped its bounds by declaring that take-or-pay 
receipts and other consideration accruing to the lessee give 
rise to a royalty obligation. The MMS's [sic] position 
appears neither arbitrary nor capricious. The most reasonable 
projection is that royalties will be due on federal lease 
take-or-pay payments in the future.
Brily, supra, at 122.
Wyoming, as to leases where the state is the lessor, has held, 
by analyzing the meaning of "production", that royalties are only 
payable when the oil or gas is severed from the earth. State v. 
Pennzoil Co.,  752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988).
In Louisiana, as to state leases, the State Mineral Board has 
adopted a resolution addressed to the take-or-pay issue and 
announced that all sumo "attributable to gas contracts . . should 
be paid to the state along with other royalties due."
Against this background of undertakings by governmental bodies 
to expand the scope of "royalty" by special definitions and 
concepts of "constructive" production, we turn back to the problem 
of leases between private parties, and an equitable analysis of the 
meaning of "royalty" and its impact on "take" funds under a take- 
or-pay contract.
The Louisiana mineral code, Article 213 provides that:
"Royalty" as used in connection with mineral leases, means any 
interest in production, or its value, from or attributable to 
land subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or 
payable to the lessor or others entitled to share 
therein. . . . "Royalty" also includes sums payable to the 
lessor that are classified by the lease as constructive 
production.
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La. Rev. Stat . Ann. $31-213(5) (West 1992).
Arkansas statutory law has also addressed this problem of a 
fair distribution of the developers/lessees recoveries in 
preformance of its duty to market. See Ark. Code Ann. § 15-74-705 
(Michie 1987) . Arkansas lav states:
It shall be the duty of both the lessee, or his assignee, 
end any pipeline company, corporation, or individual 
contracting for the purchase of oil or gas under any oil, 
gas, or mineral lease to protect the royalty of the 
lessor's interest by paying to the lessor or his 
assignees the same price including premiums, steaming 
charges, and bonuses of whatsoever name for royalty oil 
or gas that is paid the operator or lessee under the 
lease for the working interest thereunder.
Ark. Code Ann. $ 15-74-705 (Michie 1987),
The next line of cases involve four decisions arising out of 
the same case. For simplicity these cases will be cited as 
follows. The first decision, Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 708 
F.Supp. 783 (E.D. La. 1989) will be referred to as Frey 1 .
The next in this group of cases, Frey v. Amoco. Production Co. , 943 
F .2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991), will be referred to as Frey 2 . The 
third, Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 951 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1992) 
will be referred to as Frey 3 . The fourth decision, Frev v. Amoco 
Production Co., 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992) will be referred to as 
Frey 4 .
In Frey 1, Amoco, the lessee/developer, cold gas from wells of 
Frey and others to Columbia, the pipeline/marketer. Columbia 
defaulted on its "pay" obligation. Amoco had sued Columbia in
-16-
Louisiana state court; and the case was settled by Columbia's 
payment to Amoco of:
1. Approximately $21 million as non-recoupable take-or-pay.
2. Approximately $45 million as recoupable payment.
The Royalty owner-lessors then cued Amoco in the United States 
District Court for a share of the settlement. Both sides moved for 
summary judgment. The court denied Amoco's motion and granted 
Columbia's motion. The court found that Amoco had paid royalty to 
Frey on ell gas produced and sold. Amoco paid no royalty on 
payments made in settlement of Columbia's failure to keep up its 
take-or-pay payments. And, as to the recoupment taken by Columbia, 
Amoco had paid royalty at its standard rate, presumably below the 
contract value of the recouped gas. The court held that as to the 
non-recoupable payment, Fray, et al., had no claim because no gac 
had been produced and sold. And it held that Frey, et al., had no 
claim as to the recouped gas because they got the market value 
under the long term contract of sale and therefore had suffered no 
injury.
The case was appealed, Frev 2. The Fifth Circuit Court first 
distinguished Frey from Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. using the 
lease language. In shamrock t h e  lessor received as royalty a 
fraction of t h e  " a mo u n t  or v a l u e  of production saved, removed or 
sold." Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp., 853 F.2d at 1163. But, 
in Frey 2 the lessor received a fraction of the "amount realized at
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the well from the sale of gas." See Frey 2 . at 581. Also, in 
Shamrock the court applied federal law to determine the meaning of 
the Department of Interior's lease then at issue; but in Frey 2 the 
court applied the law of Louisiana, and the Louisiana Supreme Court 
had not spoken to the issue.
The court then held that under the language "amount realized 
at the well from the sale of gas", production was not required 
under Louisiana law. The court further held, inter alia, take-or- 
pay payments are part of the "amount realised" from the sale of gas 
under the lease, and thus such payments received by the lessee in 
settlement of the take-or-pay dispute with its pipeline purchaser 
for gas not taken, are subject to the lessor's royalty. Frey 2 at 
580-84. The court, relying on Louisiana law, reasoned that the 
payments "constitute economic benefits that Amoco received from 
granting Columbia the right to take gas from the leased premises, 
a right Amoco got through the lease. Id. at 584. It determined 
"it would be contrary to the nature of the lease as a cooperative 
venture to allow a benefit, by any name, that is attributable to 
the gas under the leased premises to inure exclusively to the 
lessee." Id.
The court also held that since the market value would vary 
during the period of recoupment, and the lessor's royalty share 
would vary with it, and since $45 million was paid for the 
recoupable gas, the volume of gas rather than the price per each 
thousand cubic feet (mcf) varied; and there was no problem of
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On the take-or-pay issue the circuit court reversed the 
district court's summary judgment for Amoco and hold the plaintiffs 
were entitled to their share of one-fifth of all take-or-pay 
payments received by Amoco. Id. at 586.
computing the amount due the lessor's royalty interests.
On a petition for rehearing, the circuit court in Frey 3
withdrew that portion of its opinion as to Frey's entitlement to a
royalty interest on the take-or-pay settlement, and certified to
the Louisiana Supreme court this question;
Whether under Louisiana law and the facts concerning the Lease 
executed by Amoco and Frey, the Lease's clause that provides 
Frey a 'royalty on gas sold by the Lessee of one-fifth (1/5) 
of the amount realized at the well from such sales' requires 
Amoco to pay Frey a royalty share of the take-or-pay payments 
that Amoco earns as a result of having executed the Lease and 
under the terms of a gas sales contract with a pipeline- 
purchaser.
Frey 3 at 68.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana accepted the certification in 
Frey 4 after writing that:
The controversy centers around Frey's alleged entitlement to 
a royalty share of the $66.5 million in take-or-pay amounts 
paid by Columbia to Amoco under the Settlement Agreement. The 
parties characterized $45.6 million of the total as a 
"recoupable take-or-pay payment" and the remaining $20.0 
million as a "non-recoupable take-or-pay payment."
Frey 4 at 170.
After recognizing the "fundamental principle that the lease 
contract is the law between the parties defining their respective
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legal rights and obligations” it observed that "disinclined to 
write a mineral lease in pursuit of equity, we are nonetheless 
cognizant [that] the terms of a mineral lease are neither intended 
to, nor capable of, accommodating every eventuality,” Frey 4 at 
172, Further, the court observed;
When the parties made no provision for a particular 
situation, it must be assumed that they intended to bind 
themselves not only to the express provisions of the 
contract, but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage 
regards as implied in a contract of that kind or 
necessary for the contract to achieve its purpose.
Frey 4 at 172.
The court also pointed out that it cannot realistically be 
claimed that the lessor/royalty interest shares none of the costs 
or risks of development, and noted the risks of drainage and 
defective market forecasts are, for example, risks shared by the 
lessor/royalty interest. Id. at 178.
After finding that the Louisiana Mineral Coda was not 
dispositive of lessor's right to take-or-pay payments, and that 
. . the terms of a mineral lease are neither intended to, nor
capable of, accommodating every eventuality," it looked to the 
leasehold parties' general intent, i.e. that the lessor supplied 
the land end the lessor the capital and expertise necessary to 
develop the land for the mutual benefit of both parties. Id. at 
172-73. In so doing it looked to 1) the function of the royalty 
clause and 2) to the lessor's implied obligation to market 
diligently the gas produced. Id.
The court adopted the principle that:
[A]ny determination of the market value of gas which 
admits the lessee's arrangements to market were prudently 
arrived at consistent with the lessee's obligation, but 
which at the same time permits either the lessor or the 
lessee to receive a part of the gross revenues from the
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property greater than the fractional division 
contemplated by the lease, should be considered 
inherently contrary to the basic nature of the lease and 
be sustained only in the clearest of cases.
Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp ., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1338 n.10 (La.
1982) (citing Thomas Harrell, Developments in Non-regulatory Oil
& Gas Law, 30 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n, 311, 336 (1979)).4
In further support of the proposition that royalty owners were a
entitled to share in take-or-pay monies and that the basic policy
of the lease required a division of the total benefits, it observed
that under a lease, as a bargained for exchange, the lessor would
not relinquish a valuable right without receiving something in
return. The take-or-pay contract gave the pipeline (AER) the right
not to take gas as well as the right to take gas; and such a right
had its price. Id. at 173. Further, almost invariably where take-
or-pay claims are settled, there are amendments to other provisions
of the (sale) agreement, particularly pricing and quantity
provisions, for example, a lowering of the taka obligations, even
though the settlement agreement clearly allocates settlement
payments between take-or-pay payments and modification of pricing
provisions. (See 23 Tulsa L.J. No. 4 1988). The lessee's action
has relinquished a valuable right and the lessor is entitled to
receive something in return.
[Further, i]f producers are allowed to retain ail of one 
part of the settlement (the lump sum payment), but must 
share with the royalty owners another part of the 
settlement (proceeds from future sales under the 
contract), producers have an artificial incentive to 
maximize the lump sum settlement and minimize future 
price.
Richard J .  Pierce, L e s s o r / L e s e e  R e l a t i o n s ,  i n  a  T u r b u l e n t  G as  
Market. 38 Inst. on O i l  &  Gas Law & Tax'n s-1, 8-2D (1987) .
4. Professor Thomas Harrell, Professor of oil and Gas L a w ,  
Louisiana State University Law center, Baton Rouge, La.
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The court in Frey 4 also found that the "amount realized" 
encompassed the contracted sale price of the gas per mcf, the 
amount paid in recoupable take-or-pay payment and in non-recoupable 
take-or-pay payments, and in settlement and release of the take-or- 
pay agreement. Id. at 179-80.
The writings in reference to this problem show a strong, 
developing recognition that a restrictive interpretation of the 
royalties clause in a conventional lease can be inconsistent with 
its basic purpose, and can produce results that are unintended by 
the parties, and unfair to the lessor. It is hornbook law that oil 
and gas leases are construed in favor of the lessor, if for no 
other reason than that the lessor is the uninformed and inexpert 
party to the bargain- Summer's Oil & Gas Perm Edition Vol. 2 at 
372.
We also recognize the Harrell rule, that a lease arrangement
is in the nature of a cooperative venture in which the lessor
contributes the land and the lessee the capital and experience
necessary to develop the minerals for the mutual benefit of both
parties. And it follows from that rule that:
[A]ny determination[s] of the market value of gas which 
admits the lessee's arrangements to market were prudently 
arrived at consistent with the lessee's obligation, but 
which at the same time permits either the lessor or 
lessee to receive a part of the gross revenues from the 
property greater than the fractional division 
contemplated by the lease, should be considered 
inherently contrary to the basic nature of the lease and 
be sustained only in the clearest of cases.
Harrell, supra, at 336.
N o r  is the Harrell analysis new or surprising. See Biley, 
supra, at 135. ". ..decisions that lessee owe royalties on non- 
recoupable payments . . . are legally and equitably sound." Id. 
The author supports the proposition that the royalty on recoupable 
payments should not be paid until gas is delivered at the well
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head. There the author recognizes the Hallard rule but seeks to 
follow the lease provision for capture where possible. Sea also, 
Pierce, supra, at S 8.03; John S. Lowe, Current Lease and Royalty 
Problems in the Gas Industry, 23 Tulsa L.J. 561; and Royalty 
Issues,_ Take or Pay Claims, and Division Orders, 24 Tulsa L.J. 511 
at seq. Two cases applying the concept that all benefits grounded 
on the existence of a lease must be shared in accordance with the 
lease are Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 
280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) and Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp ., 418 
s.w.2d 1334 (La. 1982) where Harrell is cited favorably, 1335 
n. 10.
6. Implied Covenant to Market Gas and Statute of Limitations.
An implied covenant to market is discussed in Summer's, Oil 
and Gas, § 400 (1959). The writer's thesis is that, whether by 
specific language in the lease or by implied covenant, leasees have 
a clear duty to market oil and gas produced, In Ware, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court found five implied covenants in oil and gas leases. 
They are:
[1.] A covenant to drill wells within a reasonable time, 
testing the land for oil and gas;
[2.] a covenant to drill test wells within a reasonable 
time after notice;
[3.] a covenant, if oil and gas be found in paying 
quantities, to proceed with reasonable diligence in 
drilling sufficient number of wells to reasonably develop 
the premises;
[4.] a covenant to protect the land from drainage
through wells on adjoining lands, by drilling offset 
wells; and
[5.] a covenant to market the produce of producing
wells.
Ware, 602 S.W.2d at 624 (citing Summers, The Law of Oil & Gas, ch 
13, §395 (vol. 2, 1959).
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The test of compliance with an implied covenant is that of a 
reasonable developer. In this case, the trial court found that a 
valid claim of failure to market had been asserted, but that it was 
lost as time barred under Ark. Code Ann. $ 16-56-105 (1987), the 
three year statute of limitations. However, based on the facts, we 
hold that the action is not time barred.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-105 provides :
The following actions shall be commenced within three
years after the cause of action accrues:
9  
3. All actions founded on any contract or
liability, express or implied;
The novation agreement between Arkoma and Arkla was formally 
executed on February 13, 1987. This action was brought by the 
filing of a complaint on February 23, 1990, three years and ten 
days later. The trial court held the three year statute
applicable, found that the statute started to run when the novation 
occurred, and dismissed the suit as time barred by ten days. 
Appellants claim that it was not until March, 1987, when they 
received their January royalty checks, that they were put on notice 
of the change in their share. Appellees admit that they attempted 
to complete the novation of the tak e-or-pay contract as secretly as 
possible.
We recognize that the clear language of § 16-56-105
encompasses the oil and gas leases of appellants, including the 
implied covenant which is an integral part of such lease. The 
precise statutory language is "all actions founded on any contract 
or liability expressed or implied;". In Scroqqin Farms Corp. v . 
Howell. 216 Ark. 569, 226 S.W.2d 562 (1950), the Arkansas Supreme 
Court observed that, "if the plaintiff, by reasonable diligence, 
might have detected the fraud he is presumed to have reasonable 
knowledge of it.”
Appellants claim the statute did not begin to run until they
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had or, by the exercise of due diligence, should have known, the 
facts that gave rise to their cause of action. We agree. The 
statute did not begin to run until late March, 1991, and the action 
is not time barred.
Summary judgment in favor of Jerrel W. Jones and Michael V. 
McCoy on all issues is reversed. The denial of dismissal as to the 
issue of breach of the covenant to market is sustained. The 
dismissal of the action on the grounds that the action is barred by 
the statute of limitations is reversed, and the case is remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.
BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.
I agree with the excellent discussion and opinion authored by 
Judge Van Sickle. I add these comments relating to the right of 
the lessors to share in the take-or-pay settlement proceeds which 
Jones and McCoy received.
As  a  general rule, oil and gas leases should be construed in 
manner so that the lessee and the lessor split all economic 
benefits arising from the land. Henry v. Ballard, 418 So. 2d 1334, 
1338 (La. 1982) ; Harrell, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil & Gas 
Law. The 30th Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law Taxation, 
Southwestern Legal Foundation, 336 (1979). The fact that a lease 
conditions the receipt of royalties on the production, instead of 
the sale, of gas, should not annul a lessor's right to receive 
proceeds from take-or-pay contracts. From an economic standpoint 
and for other reasons, a royalty should be due on take-or-pay 
payments or settlement. See Comment, The Lessor's Royalty on Take- 
on-Pay Payments
Louisiana, 47 La. L. Rev. 589 (1987).
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The exp ress terms of the le s s o r s '  le a s e s  co n d itio n  th e ir  
r e c e ip t  o f r o y a l t ie s  on the production of g a s , and therefore th ey 
do not have a r ig h t  to  rece iv e  a share o f a take-or-p ay  payment 
u n t i l  production  has occurred. This r e s u lt  i s  fa ir  because the  
p ip e lin e  may ev e n tu a lly  order d e liv ery  of a d d it io n a l gas under th e 
co n tra c t to  "make-up" fo r  the e a r lie r  d e f ic ie n c ie s .  When t h is  
"make-up" gas i s  d e liv e r e d , for which the p ip e lin e  has a lready paid  
under th e  "take-or-pay" c la u se , the le s s e e  w i l l  pay th e le s s o r  h is  
share o f  th e  va lu e o f  th a t  gas, which w i l l  approximate what the  
le s s o r  would have g o tten  had he rece ived  a share o f  the " take-or- 
pay" payment.
However, in  t h i s  c a s e , the le s s e e  and th e  p ip e lin e  term inated  
th e  gas-purchase co n tra ct and s e t t le d  th e  p ip e l in e 's  take-or-pay  
o b lig a t io n  w ith  a lump-sum payment moving from th e p ip e lin e  to the 
l e s s e e .  Because no fu tu re  purchases were  lin k ed  to  th a t  payment, 
under a s t r i c t  read ing  o f th e  le a s e , th e  le s s o r s  permanently l o s t  
t h e ir  r ig h t s  to  r e c e iv e  a portion  o f th e  r o y a lt ie s  fro m the  
se tt le m e n t . Jones and McCoy may have reaped a su b s ta n tia l b e n e f it  
from th e  le a s e  th a t  purported to  be u n rela ted  to  th e  production o f  
g a s. This r e s u lt  would c o n f l ic t  with th e  underly ing purpose o f the  
le a s e , which i s  fo r  th e  le s so r  to  r e c e iv e  a share o f  a l l  proceeds 
generated  by th e land , and may have r e su lte d  in  Jones and McCoy 
r e c e iv in g  a p o te n t ia l ly  unjust enrichment. See Comment, Royalty on
Take-or-Pay__Payments__and  R elated__Con sid e r a t io n s Accruing to
P roducers, 27 Houston L. Rev. 105, 134 n .225 (1990). Instead  o f  
view ing th o se  proceeds as a w in d fa ll th a t  th e  le s s e e s  (but not the  
le s s o r s )  rece iv ed  due to  contractual maneuvering, a court should  
regard a lump-sum take-or-p ay  se ttlem en t as p art o f the proceeds 
a r is in g  from th e  s a le s  o f gas th a t p rev io u sly  had been produced 
under th e  c o n tr a c t . S ee Callery P r opertis 
Comm' n , 335 F .2d lOO4 , 1021 (holding th a t tak e-or-p ay  p ro v isio n s  
gen erate proceeds from "sales" within th e  meaning of th e  Natural 
Gas A ct, 15 U .S .C . § 717(b) (1964)) .  E s s e n t ia l ly ,  the settlem en t  
could rep resen t how much Arkla was w il l in g  to  pay: 1) to  be
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released from the contract; and, in effect, 2) for the gas it has 
already received under the contract.
Thus, with regard to the lessors' unjust enrichment claim 
against Jones and McCoy, a substantial question or fact exists in 
this case as to whether, under the leases, the lessors had a right 
to receive a portion of the take-or-pay settlement that Arkla paid 
Jones and McCoy. If the lessors should have received a share of 
those proceeds, then Jones and McCoy were unjustly enriched, and 
they may have to share a portion of that "take-or-pay" settlement 
with the lessors.
A true copy.
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[6] In sum, we do not decide either of petitioner’s argu-
ments for the writ because they were not raised below We are 
aware that the petitioner labels this an original action in this 
court, and the petitioner might argue, on rehearing, that it is not 
necessary in an original action to have raised the issues before the 
trial court when the facts are undisputed. In some original actions 
the argument might be valid, but not when the petition is based on 
lack of venue. M onette Road Improvement Dist. v. Dudley, 144 
Ark. 169, 222 S.W . 59 (1920).
Petition denied.
STEPH ENS PRODUCTION COM PANY, Arkla, Inc., 
Arkla Exploration Company, and Arkoma 
Production Company v. Mildred M. JOHNSO N, 
Trustee o f the Mildred M. Johnson Trust,
Mamie J. Keifer, Rosamond Johnson, Nora 
House, Sara Adams Ridgway, Sunbelt 
Exploration Company, and Jim T. Walker
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Appe a l  & err or  —  parties  mu s t  a bst rac t  essential  por ti o ns  o f
THE PROCEEDINGS — WITHOUT PROPER ABSTRACT, CHANCELLOR IS 
a f f ir m ed . — Where there was no abstract, by either the appellants 
or the cross-appellants, of the complaint, the cross-complaint, or 
either of the answers, nor was there an abstract of the chancellor’s 
findings of fact or the final order, the appellate court had no choice 
but to affirm the final order for failure of the parties to comply with 
Rule 9(d); it is necessary for a party to abstract the essential 
portions of the proceedings relied upon for appeal purposes.
Appeal from Franklin Chancery Court; Richard E. Gard- 
ner, Jr., Judge; affirmed.
Sm ith , Stroud, M cClerkin, Dunn & N u tte r , by; Hayes C. 
M cClerkin  and Barry A. Bryant, for appellants.
Turner & Mainard, by: Lonnie Turner, for appellees.
Ro be r t  H. Du dle y , Justice. The chancellor cancelled the 
oil and gas leases to some of the vertical geological formations of a 
drilling unit. The defendant production companies appeal from 
the chancellor’s finding that they have abandoned some of the 
formations, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal from the finding that 
the defendants have not totally abandoned the leases.
We cannot reach the merits of the case and must affirm the 
final order on both direct and cross-appeal for failure of the 
parties to comply with Rule 9(d) of the Rules of the Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeals. There is no abstract, by either the 
appellants or the cross-appellants, of the complaint, the cross- 
complaint, or either of the answers. An abstract of those plead-
ings would be helpful. There is no abstract of the chancellor’s 
findings of fact or of the final order, and these are essential in 
order to understand this case. Equally critical are certain exhibits 
which are not abstracted or copied. The testimony of the 
witnesses about the exhibits is abstracted, but, without the 
exhibits, much of the testimony about the issues is meaningless.
[1] It is necessary for a party to abstract the essential 
portions of the proceedings relied upon for appeal purposes. 
Otherwise, all seven members of the court would have to pass, 
from office to office, the one transcript and the one set o f exhibits 
in order to examine and understand the case, and, with the 
number of cases submitted, that is impossible. We have no 
alternative other than to do as we have done in other comparable 
cases and affirm the decree of the chancellor. See Hunter v. 
Williams, 308 Ark. 276, 823 S.W .2d 894 (1992); Meyers Gen. 
Agency v. Lavender, 301 Ark. 503,785 S .W .2d 28 (1990); Cash 
v. Holder, 293 Ark. 537, 739 S.W.2d 538 (1987); and Zini v. 
PercifuL 289 Ark. 343, 711 S.W.2d 477 (1986).
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 9(d).
Hol t , C. J. and Br o w n , J., not participating.
Special Chief Justice Wr ig h t  and Special Justice Ross 
concur.
Ro be r t  R. Wrig ht , Special Chief Justice, concurring. I 
concur in this decision with great reluctance. I concur only
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because Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals has been violated. It is my view that Rule 9 should be 
amended to provide that as soon as the problem has been 
discovered, the attorney involved be given thirty days in which to 
correct the problem by filling a new abstract or such missing 
documents as may present a problem. As it exists in its present 
form, Rule 9 is extremely harsh to litigants and lawyers alike. It is 
procedural in nature, but its application is punitive. The Rule 
should be amended as stated to ameliorate its harshness and to 
prevent injustice to those litigants whom it affects.
The situation in this case was such that the justices involved 
had to place great reliance upon the transcripts. There were five 
volumes, and I read most of them totally and some in part. I also 
examined the legal issues, involved in a number of cases, treatises, 
and law review articles. I felt qualified after that to render a 
judgment on the merits.
It is my opinion, in that regard, that the Chancellor would 
have been affirmed, at least in large measure, if the merits had 
been reached. Under those circumstances, the application of Rule 
9 would seem to make little difference in the outcome. While 
there was conflicting testimony and evidence, this Court adheres 
to the proposition that the Chancellor will be affirmed unless his 
holding is clearly erroneous. If for no other reason, affirmance 
would probably have resulted even though I did not agree with 
him in some respects.
One thing that I would have commented on if the case had 
been decided on the merits is a rule in Arkansas oil and gas law 
that seems not to be the better rule and, in fact, is contrary to that 
of some of our neighboring, oil-producing states. In Arkansas, a 
new lessee can obtain a second lease from the lessor and then 
notify the first lessee that his lease is not any good due to the 
failure to drill. Byrd v. Bradham, 280 Ark. 11, 655 S.W.2d 366 
(1983); S. Wright, The Arkansas Law o f Oil and Gas, 10 U. Ark. 
Little Rock L J. 699, 705 (1988). The better rule is that there 
should be a burden on the lessor to notify the lessee that if a well is 
not drilled within a certain reasonable period of time, the lease 
will be cancelled and there will be a new lessee. E. Kuntz, J. Lowe, 
O. Anderson, & E. Smith, Oil and Gas Law 287 (1986). The 
effect of non-drilling would not necessarily cancel the lease,
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which would still be subject to the prudent operator standard and 
the implied covenant of reasonable development, but requiring 
notice might help to prevent litigation, which should be an object 
of the judicial system.
J a me s  A. Ross, J r ., Special Associate Justice, concurring. I 
concur in the results reached by the Court, but for different 
reasons. I would not affirm because of a failure to comply with 
Rule 9(d) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals. However, based on the merits of the case, I would affirm 
the Decree of the Chancery Court of Franklin County on both 
direct appeal and cross-appeal.
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1. Cri m i n a l  l a w  —  pa s s e n g e r  f o u n d  by  t r i a l  c o u r t  n o t  to  be
a n  ACCOMPLICE —  REMAINING EVIDENCE CLEARLY CONNECTED
a ppe l l a n t  to  th e  c r im e . — Where the trial judge found that the 
passenger was not an accomplice, even though the police found him 
crouched down in the vehicle as they drove up to investigate, the 
appellate court could not say on that ambiguous circumstance that 
he was an accomplice as a matter of law.
2. Cri m i n a l  l a w  —  e v i d e n c e  cl ea rl y  c o n n e c t e d  a ppe l l a n t  t o  
the  c r i m e . — The remaining evidence connecting the appellant to 
the robbery was clear beyond any serious question — the clerk 
described the robber as a black male wearing white pants, camou-
flaged jacket and ski mask; two officers saw a man dressed 
accordingly enter and leave the store headed toward the parked 
vehicle containing papers belonging to the appellant; the ski mask 
was found some thirty feet from the car, as were tracks leading 
toward the car and then away from it; the clerk identified the 
appellant’s voice as that of the robber; the evidence, though 
circumstantial, was entirely adequate to support the conviction.
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Jack L. Lessenberry,
